CLIMATE-FRAGILITY POLICY PAPER:

EUROPE AND CLIMATE SECURITY: IS EUROPE DELIVERING ON ITS RHETORIC?
Europe and Climate Security: Is Europe delivering on its rhetoric?

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The Climate Security Expert Network, which comprises some 30 international experts, supports the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and the Climate Security Mechanism of the UN system. It does so by synthesising scientific knowledge and expertise, by advising on entry points for building resilience to climate-security risks, and by helping to strengthen a shared understanding of the challenges and opportunities of addressing climate-related security risks.

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Europe is a champion for greater action on both climate change and the pursuit of international peace and security. Over the past 15 years, the combination of the two issues, or climate-related risks to peace and stability, have risen fast up the European agenda. Landmarks have included: the UK’s sponsorship of the first ever UN Security Council debate on climate change in 2007; High Representative Solana’s 2008 report on Climate Change and International Security; the successful adoption of the Paris agreement in 2015; the 2016 Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy; High Representative Mogherini’s June 2018 high-level meeting on Climate, Peace and Security; and the 2019 European Green Deal.

European countries and EU institutions have certainly given a great deal of political attention to the security threats posed by climate change. This report explores the extent to which this policy focus has influenced the international agenda and the degree to which it has translated into improved European responses to the causes and consequences of insecurity in fragile states.

There is little doubt that European states and institutions are committed to raising climate security up the international agenda, with European states supporting multiple (mostly open and non-binding) debates at the Security Council, a new UN clearing-house mechanism for climate security information, and a growing set of (geographically specific) resolutions that recognize the adverse effects of climate change on stability. This has opened up a degree of political space for action on climate insecurity that did not exist even a decade ago. But occupying a prominent position on the political agenda is no guarantee that it will be addressed effectively in real terms.

Here, there is progress. The EU has the ability to combine a wide variety of economic and political policy tools, which affords the bloc a scope for action that is unparalleled in most other regional organisations. Climate security is being integrated in a limited fashion in the EU’s early warning systems and conflict-prevention activities. Resilience to climate change has become a driving rationale for much of Europe’s overseas development aid and humanitarian spending.

But there are also gaps. While climate insecurity as an issue has gained traction in headquarters, this has yet to filter down in a systematic manner to operations planning and actual missions in the field. In cases where it has been integrated, this appears to be the result of individual initiative by project managers rather than a systematic approach to managing climate security risks. There tends to be little learning across projects, departments within the EU and among European countries, which makes it harder to scale up successful approaches elsewhere.

Meanwhile, the financial investment in addressing the security impacts of climate change does not seem to be commensurate with its position on the European agenda. For example, less than two per cent of projects under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (one of the EU’s main vehicles for conflict-prevention programming) mention climate insecurity in their rationale and objectives.

Importantly, Europe’s efforts to overhaul its own energy systems and economic model to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, captured most clearly in the European Green Deal presented in 2019, could have a range of geopolitical and global security consequences, including on peace and conflict dynamics. These also need to be anticipated and addressed if Europe is to have a coherent, effective and positive impact on the growing security threats presented by climate change, biodiversity loss and environmental degradation.

This report proposes three areas for action. The first is to ensure that climate security stays high on a packed and urgent international agenda. In particular:
Support the creation of a UN Climate Security Senior Advisor or Envoy at the New York UN Headquarters supported by the existing Climate Security Mechanism. This person could act as a focal point for climate security action across the UN and be available to brief the Security Council as needed.

Support an “omnibus resolution” on climate security through the UN Security Council, which could help set new international norms and practice about dealing with climate security.

Improve coordination among the donor countries funding research on climate security to avoid duplication, to ensure that a broad range of relevant issues are addressed and to highlight the voices and lived experience of people in affected regions.

Work closely with regional organizations such as the African Union to ensure coherence of action.

The second area for action aims to ensure that European operations in fragile states address climate insecurity in their programmes. The report presents a series of specific recommendations to that end:

- Appoint a senior adviser or a Special Envoy on climate security in the cabinet of the High Representative, with responsibility and accountability for delivering a coherent response to climate security challenges and to help Europe with its “last mile” problem of ensuring commensurate action on the ground.
- Lead by example. Define a climate and environmental security policy that lays out the approaches to be pursued by the EU instruments. This should be coupled with an environmental management system with clear lines of accountability that cuts through the organisation, but where responsibility ultimately rests with the senior management.
- Conduct a thorough independent mapping and review of different climate security work taking place across Europe to find gaps and duplication. Invest in mechanisms to share information, such as the Planetary Security Conference initiated by the Netherlands in 2017, and gather lessons on what is working to inform how action can be scaled up.
- Ensure greater coordination of action between the relevant communities, services and ministries (defence, environment etc…) so that climate change and environmental issues feature prominently in defence and security processes and gatherings such as the Munich Security Conference.
- Integrate conflict sensitivity in the planning, monitoring and execution of mitigation and adaptation programmes. Ensure that the geopolitical and security impact of such policies are taken into consideration.
- Harness a full range of tools for resilience and security. The Green Deal and the EU’s actions on adaptation must recognise cross-border climate impacts and prepare to integrate risk management measures into a much wider group of policies, from trade to welfare.

The last area for action relates to investments in conflict prevention, mediation and peace processes:

- Increase the focus on climate security in financial instruments designed to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- Invest in expanding the cadre of mediators and peace negotiators who understand climate science and the dynamics around climate security.
- Ensure that conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding is part of the mandate of the senior adviser on climate security for the EU.
INTRODUCTION

“When we invest in the fight against climate change, we invest in our own security.”

Frederica Mogherini,
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
High-level event on Climate, Peace and Security, 22 June 2018

Over the past 15 years, climate-related risks to peace and stability have risen fast up the European agenda. While European countries and European institutions have been vocal in their calls for ambitious global action on climate change, they have also increasingly emphasised the importance of linking climate action with effective multilateral cooperation on international peace and security.

In 2008, the potentially unprecedented, cascading impacts of climate change on human well-being and security were formally raised in a landmark report produced by European Commission High Representative Javier Solana. Two years ago, in 2018, a high-profile event organised by his successor, High Representative Frederica Mogherini, and attended by dozens of foreign ministers, aimed to elevate the issue to the very centre of European foreign and security policy.

Collectively, Europe has invested time, energy and precious political capital on these issues. The core question of this report is this: How can Europe ensure that its efforts to address climate, peace and security are as coherent and effective as possible?

Europe currently finds itself in the midst of the bewildering impacts of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, some of which may foreshadow some of the predicted impacts of climate change. In this context assessing how Europe is tackling climate security may also be relevant for a range of other non-traditional security threats.

The climate security challenge for Europe

Climate security has climbed up the European agenda first and foremost because global warming presents a multi-faceted risk to the entire continent. The EU’s own research estimates that Europe could be facing three degrees of warming over the pre-industrial average temperature by end of this century, unless there are ambitious reductions in the global production of greenhouse gases.

Under these conditions Europe would feel like a very different place (see Figure 1). One in two Europeans would suffer water scarcity. The continent would face a 15-fold increase in economic damage to infrastructure. The area of cropland affected by drought would increase seven-fold. In some areas agricultural yields could decline by as much as 20 per cent. The increase in temperatures could mean 132,000 additional deaths every year from extreme heat (Bergamaschi and Bélanger 2019).

In addition, with its strong political, trade, business, financial and cultural links to the rest of the world, Europe is exposed, not only to the local effects of its own changing climate, but also its consequences elsewhere (Benzie et al. 2016). As the Covid-19 pandemic is

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1 Our research draws on the available literature as well as a number of semi-structured interviews with European Union staff past and present, and with experts. It does not purport to address all issues pertaining to climate security. For instance, it does not assess the climate impact of the European military institutions or the performance of the EU compared to other regional organisations Analysis of the latter can be found in Krampe and Mobjörk (2018)’s review climate security responses at ASEAN, SAARC, ECOWAS and IGAD.

2 By Europe we include European countries (including those not in the EU such as the UK) as well as EU institutions. The paper does not extend to assessing the way that other European based organisations that promote collective security and/or greater cooperation - such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are tackling the security impacts of climate change.
demonstrating, the globalised trade and financial systems and the just-in-time nature of supply chains have once again shown the fragility of our interconnected societies and the need to tackle global issues together (Hildén et al. 2020).

To the north, a melting Arctic offers newly accessible and valuable mineral and oil resources. Elsewhere, the convergence of different pressures in politically fragile parts of the world is likely to increase the overall number of crises on Europe’s own doorstep while reversing development gains around the world (Rüttinger et al. 2015).

This would, of course, have very real consequences for Europe itself (see Figure 1 on Europe’s main climate vulnerabilities). These include shifts in geopolitical power, growing demands for humanitarian and development assistance, as well as increases in the number of ‘climate migrants’ in terms of people displaced by storms, droughts, desertification and floods exacerbated by climate change. While many - if not the majority - may be displaced within their own countries, experts calculate that, even under a moderate emissions scenario, asylum applications to the EU by the end of the century could increase by 28 per cent as a result of climate change (Bergamaschi et al. 2019).

Figure 1: Key observed and projected climate change and impacts for the main biogeographical regions in Europe (Source: EEAS 2017, p. 21)
The emergence of climate security as an issue of European concern

European countries and European institutions were relatively quick to translate the emerging understanding of the security impacts of climate change into political statements (See Annex 1 for a timeline of European policy developments on climate security). Climate change was first mentioned as an issue of concern in the 2003 European Security Strategy (Bremberg and Mobjörk 2018). In 2007, the United Kingdom sponsored a first debate on climate security at the Security Council of the United Nations.

This growing awareness gained momentum with High Representative Javier Solana’s 2008 report. This stated that climate change should be understood as a threat multiplier exacerbating existing security risks as a result of such phenomena as water and food scarcity, pandemics or displacement (EC 2008). Importantly, the Solana paper argued that action was in Europe’s direct security interest, and that it represented a means of tackling fragility around the world.3

Since then a succession of high-profile reports, events and statements have helped to solidify climate security as a policy issue of importance to Europe. In 2012 the Green Diplomacy Network (originally established in 2003) was incorporated into the European External Action Service (EEAS) with the aim of better integrating environmental priorities into EU foreign policy (Bremberg et al. 2018).

Climate security is prominently included in the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, which states that “Climate change and environmental degradation exacerbate potential conflict” and cites climate as “a threat multiplier that catalyses water and food scarcity, pandemics and displacement” (EC 2016).

In February 2018, the Foreign Affairs Council—the grouping of EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs—published their “Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy.” The conclusions recognised that “climate change has direct implications for international security and stability.” The Council resolved to, “further mainstream the nexus between climate change and security in policy dialogue, conflict prevention, development and humanitarian action and disaster risk strategies” (Council of the EU 2018). Similar statements appear in the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council in 2019 and 2020 (Council of the EU 2019; 2020).

But while climate security has been given increasing rhetorical prominence in European foreign policy, concrete, ambitious action to counter the security threats posed by climate change has been more difficult to track.

Back in 2008, Javier Solana noted that,

“[…] the EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in development, global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal. Moreover, the security challenge plays to Europe’s strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, and as a key proponent of effective multilateralism.”

The report urged the EU to enhance its capacities for prevention and preparedness to provide quick responses to conflict, for the EU to show leadership in the multilateral arena,
and finally, for the EU to ramp up cooperation with third countries on climate change mitigation and adaptation, good governance, and natural resource management (EC 2008).

Ten years later, on 22 June 2018, his successor as High Representative, Federica Mogherini, hosted a high-level meeting entitled Climate, Peace and Security: The Time for Action. Its aim was to project Europe in general, and the EU in particular, as major players in global action on climate change and global cooperation on peace and security.

Participants at the meeting emphasised that the EU needed to further develop its capacities to address the security impacts of climate change more effectively (Bremberg 2019). The event made six recommendations:

1. Elevate climate-security nexus to highest political level in national, regional and multilateral fora
2. Deploy maximum political and diplomatic efforts to support Paris Agreement implementation
3. Mobilise and improve reporting and early warning systems
4. Put a premium on prevention: building state and societal resilience
5. Promote the role of women as agents of social, economic and political change
6. Make action on the ground a source of sustainability, strength and peace

This paper uses these six areas to assess the extent to which Europe is putting its own rhetoric into practice. To this list we add a seventh issue: Avoiding unintended security consequences of European climate action.
Elevate the climate security nexus

The first area that the June 2018 meeting suggested required further work was to elevate the climate-security nexus to the highest political level in national, regional and multilateral fora (EEAS, 2018).

European countries and institutions have certainly kept up a steady rhetorical drum beat on climate security. In early 2019, the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) reiterated their conclusion that climate change acts as a threat multiplier and underlined their concern that it is fragile countries are the most exposed and least able to respond to climate change (Council of the EU 2019). In November 2019 the European Parliament, under pressure from campaigners like Greta Thunberg, declared a climate emergency in 2019 (EU Parliament 2019). In January 2020, EU Foreign Ministers again met to discuss ways to step up climate diplomacy. They renewed their commitment to place climate action at the heart of the EU’s external policy. The Council called on the High Representative, Commission and member states to work to develop concrete operational ways forward on climate diplomacy. They asked for these options to be presented by June 2020 (Council of the EU 2020).

European Union Member States and the United Kingdom have been persistent in raising climate security at the UN Security Council. Sweden, Italy, Netherland, Belgium and Germany have all made climate security a theme during their rotating seats on the Council. The UK and France, as the two European permanent members on the Security Council, have also regularly pushed the issue, starting with the UK-hosted debate in 2007. Since then there have been numerous debates (see Annex 2).

Just after the June 2018 high-level event, Germany and Nauru launched the Group of Friends of Climate and Security as an informal network of New York based delegations interested in further action on climate security. The group began with 25 founding countries but now counts more than 50 members, around 20 of whom are European nations, constituting by far the biggest regional grouping.

Internationally, European nations have been vocal advocates for greater global attention to climate security. Climate security has also become a more prominent part of Europe’s political negotiations with other regional organisations. For example the EU concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the AU in 2018 on Peace, Security and Governance. The agreement committed the two entities to:

“Jointly cooperate on climate-related security threats across peace and security policy arenas, to strengthen the capacity to address the risks of instability, insecurity and conflict arising from the interaction of climate change and social, economic, demographic and political factors.”

These efforts have undoubtedly created greater political “space” for the discussion of the security impacts of climate change. Within a relatively short period of time, and despite a history of scepticism on the part of some Permanent Members, climate security has become a semi-regular fixture on the agenda of the Security Council.

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4 “Ambition in climate action is not only about reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it is also about addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security.... On top of mitigation and adaptation, resilience building, food and nutrition security, disaster risk reduction, conflict prevention and sustainable development, notably sustainable demand side management and management and use of natural resources and nature-based solutions, are all basic pillars of climate change risk management. Integrating a security perspective within all of these processes, while ensuring inclusive participation, is fundamental in order to alleviate the destabilising impacts of climate change and its negative impact on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.” (Council of the EU 2019)
Importantly, this has led to change in the Security Council’s resolutions as pertain to specific countries or regions. In a landmark March 2017 resolution (#2349) on the Lake Chad sub-region, the Council recognised “the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity.” It also emphasised, “the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors.”

Since then, there have been another dozen or so similar resolutions. The majority of these have been geographically specific resolutions which have required several UN peace operations to take climate security into consideration in their planning and monitoring (see Annex 2). Resolution 2423 on Mali (June 2018), for example, recognises the adverse effects of climate change on stability in the country and asks MINUSMA and the Malian government to take these and other ecological changes into account in their activities, programmes and strategies.

Germany, which assumed the rotating Presidency of the Security Council for the month of July 2020, considered a wide-ranging resolution on climate security, akin to Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. As a way of preparing the ground for such a move, in June 2019, a group of NGOs and thinktanks led by Adelphi and with the support of the German Federal Foreign Ministry released the “Berlin call for Action: improving the climate for peace,” which called for risk-informed planning, enhanced capacity for action, and better operational responses to become central foreign policy priorities.

One institutional innovation that has been discussed in the resolution is a Special Envoy for Climate Security who would report directly to the UN Secretary-General and endeavour to rally greater international action on climate security.

Some permanent members are still uneasy at the real or perceived “mission creep” of the Security Council veering into environmental issues. So far this has resulted in fairly general language on climate security and resistance to anything more than passing references to climate security in geographically limited resolutions. Nonetheless it is hard to imagine that climate security would have won the international prominence it has without the persistence and patience of European nations and institutions.

**Deploy maximum efforts for Paris implementation**

The second area identified for further action was the need to deploy maximum political and diplomatic efforts to support the implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement is, after all, the first line of defence to avoid the sort of climate tipping points—wholesale melting of the Greenland ice sheet, die-back of the Amazon rainforest, shifts to the Gulf Stream and so on—that would lead to potentially catastrophic climate-related security threats.

The Paris Agreement was a diplomatic success for European climate activism, particularly in the wake of the contentious Copenhagen meeting of 2009 where discussions broke down in acrimony. Its passage was helped by extensive shuttle diplomacy from many European diplomats in the 18 months that preceded the December 2015 21st Conference of the Parties (COP). The links between climate change and security were used by a number of foreign ministers, such as the then French Foreign Minister and COP co-President Laurent Fabius⁶ to make the case for an ambitious agreement (Harvey 2016).

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⁶ French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius: “This is about security and peace... There are massive risks to global warming, which could lead to widespread conflict. We have to stop that risk from becoming reality. That means this agreement was actually about peace for future generations, and current generations. This is a chaotic world, and a dangerous one. The Paris agreement is making the world safer.”
Since then, European institutions have looked to increase domestic climate ambitions and push for greater implementation of the Paris agreement internationally. They express particular concern at plans by the US to withdraw from the Paris agreement and the lack of progress in substantially reducing global emissions by other G20 powers. In 2020, the EU was planning to submit a revised and more ambitious target for its 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs). However, this may still be delayed along with the postponed next Conference of the Parties, now expected for the second half of 2021.

Meanwhile, the EU and European countries have been active in supporting other countries to enhance the commitments in their own NDCs.

In December 2019, following the EU Parliament’s November declaration of a climate emergency, the European Council adopted the European Green Deal. This is a set of policy initiatives with the overarching aim of making Europe climate neutral by 2050. The same month, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen appointed Frans Timmermans as Executive Vice President of the European Commission for the European Green Deal. On 15 January 2020 the European Parliament voted to support the deal and asked that its level of ambition be raised.

The next EU Budget, which runs from 2021 to 2027, commits the EU to spending 25 per cent of its budget on climate action, up from 20 per cent in the previous period (Pilsner et al. 2019). The EU has also increased its immediate targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions to at least 50 per cent and towards 55 per cent over 1990 levels by 2030.

But climate change is the ultimate collective action problem. Europe accounts for only nine per cent of global emissions, and that ratio is likely to fall relative to other countries. As such, Europe’s security depends on whether other countries—especially big emitters such as the US, China and India—change their energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.

Europe, as a major trading power and financial centre, has some levers which it can use to incentivise climate action elsewhere and spur innovation at scale. The European Green Deal, for example, includes proposals for carbon tariffs to be applied to countries that don’t curtail their greenhouse gas production fast enough.

However, Europe’s ability to influence greenhouse gas mitigation overseas through its trade, development and foreign policies is in roughly inverse ratio to the size of a country’s emissions. Broadly speaking, Europe has less influence over the major emitters than the small, poor recipients of its development largesse, which do not themselves significantly contribute to global warming.

**Mobilise and improve early warning systems**

The third area is the need to improve the way that Europe assesses and anticipates climate risks. This would allow European decision makers to quickly identify climate-related hazards such as droughts, storms and floods that almost invariably have knock-on impacts on social and economic stability both in Europe and beyond (EEAS, 2018).

This area has been a focus of European attention internationally. Since 2013, the European Commission has been a core supporter of the INFORM index which is a global collaboration with the Interagency Standing Committee which aims to provide objective and transparent information on the risk of humanitarian crises.7

Meanwhile, Sweden used its rotating seat on the Security Council in 2017-8 to advocate for (and to fund) the creation of the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM). The CSM, which began operating in late 2018, is a three-way initiative managed by the UN Environment Programme

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In essence, the CSM is designed as a clearing house for information from across the UN system to provide rapid, tailored advice to UN leadership and the Security Council on emerging climate-related security risks. It also works to strengthen partnerships on early warning with regional organisations such as the African Union and the European Union. Since its creation the CSM has been busy building a community of practice across the UN system to ensure that climate risks are taken into account across the work of more than two dozen agencies, funds and programmes. It has developed a new methodology for assessing climate risks and is beginning to deploy advisors into country-level programmes. However, it remains to be seen whether the CSM is able to provide clear guidance on politically contentious issues. The fact that it is a tripartite arrangement with no single organisation in the lead and where every decision is subject of complicated sign-offs means that mechanism remains inherently cautious and captured by a degree of institutional inertia.

There have also been efforts to improve early warning at the European level. In 2014, the EEAS put in place its own early warning system under the responsibility of what is now the Division for the Integrated Approach for Security and Peace (ISP) (Musiol, 2019). This early warning system aims to inform the military and civilian crisis management operations’ peace and security activities. This includes everything from analysis to conflict prevention initiatives, mediation strategies, peacebuilding priority plans and the footprint of multilateral peace operations. Every year the ISP uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative data to identify a number of countries at risk of conflict over the next four years.

On the qualitative side, the EU’s early warning system now incorporates a climate dimension in its assessment of which situations should be conflict prevention priorities. This includes a study of vulnerability to climate change provided by DG CLIMA. The EU’s assessment of the structural risks of conflict now includes a dedicated section on climate change and disasters. Climate change is also taken into account when designing preventive responses. The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre provides the quantitative dimension of this early warning system in the form of a Global Conflict Risk Index (GCRI). The index collects open-source data across 24 variables and uses statistical regression models to calculate the probability and intensity of violent conflict.

Since 2018, the GCRI has included one variable related to climate in the form of data on water stress (Halkia et al, 2018). But this is still one dimensional. The GCRI does not, for example, include data on natural disasters or other climate shocks. There are also questions about how much this is truly informing risk analysis and action on the ground, as roughly two-thirds of EEAS staff members are assigned to geographical desks. This is where the EEAS “heavy lifting” is done, so it is not always clear how much these cross-cutting thematic issues impact the design of day-to-day operations. But, the neat theory of this system is sometimes derailed by reality if Member States have different views on what should be done in the form of early action. This can paralyse the EU’s abilities to prevent the escalation of a crisis (Musiol 2019; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2013).

Meanwhile, several European countries are supporting their own early warning systems in parallel to—and possibly duplicating—those at the regional level (Musiol 2019). The Netherlands is supporting the Water, Peace and Security Partnership which has a strong early warning component. Another example is a new multi-partner Risk Informed Early Action Partnership, formed in October 2019. This will be funded by the UK government up to COP 26. One of its targets is to ensure that a billion people are covered by new or improved early warning systems as a result of the project. There appears to be little

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analysis of how this “ecosystem” of early warning systems interacts and how interlinkages and policy impact can be enhanced and duplication minimised.

Finally, European governments and EU research funds support a sizeable ecosystem of researchers and thinktanks across Europe working on climate security. This group constitutes a diverse epistemic community of expertise\(^\text{10}\) which generates reports and organises numerous awareness raising, information sharing and training events. This itself is a decentralised form of early warning and conflict analysis. It provides valuable perspectives and information on where, when and how new climate-related security risks might appear. This group would certainly not exist in the form it has without consistent support over the years from European governments and institutions. In future, it would be very helpful to see how this community could perhaps be more structured and how the common analysis could inform better and more directly rapid action on the ground.

**Put a premium on prevention and resilience**

The fourth area identified as one of the priorities for further action is the need to “put a premium on prevention and resilience” in domestic policies and international cooperation. Prevention, argues the EU, needs to be rooted in sustainable livelihoods, the equitable use of natural resources and informed by early warning systems (EEAS, 2018). This ambition falls into the category of one of those things that is easy to say, but difficult to do.

Nor is it a new aim. There was a rhetorical focus on resilience and prevention long before 2018. The 2016 Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy noted that, “It has long been known that preventing conflicts is more efficient and effective than engaging with crises after they break out. Once a conflict does erupt, it typically becomes ever more intractable over time.” The strategy committed the EU to “redouble our efforts on prevention, monitoring root causes such as human rights violations, inequality, resource stress, and climate change” (EU, 2016). This objective was echoed in the European Green Deal which promised that, “The EU will work with all partners to increase climate and environmental resilience to prevent these challenges from becoming sources of conflict, food insecurity, population displacement and forced migration, and support a just transition globally” (EC, 2019a).

“Resilience” as a concept is a central objective for a great deal of the European money spent on adaptation to climate change at home and overseas. Active since 2008, the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+) is a major channel for EU support to policy dialogue and targeted climate action in developing countries. One initiative funded by GCCA+ is the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (AGIR). This was launched in 2012 to improve food security and strengthen the resilience of nine countries across the Sahel. Another EU-supported initiative in the Sahel is the “Great Green Wall,” a multi-billion euro, African-led effort to reforest and restore degraded land across an 8,000 kilometre swath of the Sahel.\(^\text{11}\)

Resilience is likewise a theme in the EU’s humanitarian spending. In 2014, the EU introduced a “resilience marker,” which encourages all humanitarian projects to include options to reduce future risks; by 2016, 43 per cent of all ECHO-funded projects included activities related to Disaster Risk Reduction (ECHO, 2016).

Resilience is also part of the rationale for the two EU funding streams that, among much else, address some of the manifestations of climate insecurity: the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace (IcSP) and the EU Emergency Trust fund for Africa (EUTF). To pick

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\(^{10}\) Any list will inevitably omit some important players, but active European organisations in the field of climate security include adelphi, Chatham House, the Clingendael Institute, the European Institute of Peace (EIP), the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Institute for Environmental Security (IES), International Alert, Interpeace, the Planetary Security Institute, the Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Third Generation Environmentalists (E3G), and the Peace Research Institute of Oslo.

\(^{11}\) https://www.unccd.int/actions/great-green-wall-initiative
just one example: The South Sudan Rural Development Strengthening Smallholders’ Resilience programme (SORUDEV SSR) was allocated €15 million by the EUTF to strengthen communities and smallholders’ resilience in South Sudan to make them less vulnerable to conflict and extreme climate conditions.12

In addition, many European donors have resilience as a theme in their own development and conflict prevention programmes. The UK-funded BRACED initiative (Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and Disasters) aims to improve the integration of disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation methods into development approaches in African Sahel and South and Southeast Asia.13

A focus on resilience is an important part of a set of activities which are being collectively termed a “responsibility to prepare” (Fetzek and Schaik, 2018). But estimating whether Europe has actually been successful in building “resilience” in places likely to be affected by climate insecurity is a frustratingly difficult task. Partly this is because the concept of resilience itself is “slippery.” The term is understood in different ways across the foreign policy, humanitarian, development and defence communities. It is also a highly relative concept (resilient compared to what? resilient against what?) and is it difficult to monitor progress or prove success (as It is impossible to know what might have happened in the absence of the resilience programmes). Consequently, while “resilience” provides a helpful way of thinking about risk it has become a buzzword that is attached to many different activities. As such it may not, by itself, do much to foster the kind of integration of purpose and action across European foreign policy that is needed to address climate insecurity.

Promote the role of women as agents of social, economic and political change

The fifth priority identified by the EU was the promotion of women as a key pillar of the solution to climate insecurity:

“By harnessing women's roles as agents of change, the adoption of lower carbon lifestyles and passing on “green values” to the next generation can be accelerated. Enhancing the socio-economic rights and status of women not only rectifies their disproportionate vulnerability to climate change impacts, but also gives them a greater say in shaping policies and prioritising how climate finance is used (EEAS, 2018).”

The importance of gender equality and empowering women is noted in nearly every EU foreign policy document and European country policy position. Europe has played an important role in mainstreaming more gender responsive approaches across many dimensions of its foreign and development policy. Some individual countries, such as Sweden, have gone further by articulating a specific feminist foreign policy agenda focused on gender equality (Vogelstein and Bro 2019).

Several EU climate, resilience and peacebuilding projects have a strong focus on gender. The UK’s BRACED programme in Africa and South Asia, for example, aims to support knowledge sharing about gender issues related to extreme climate events, and particularly about the role of women and girls in adapting and building resilience to climate change. The EU-supported Wadi-el Ku Catchment Management programme in the Sudanese region of Northern Darfur, managed by UNEP and Practical Action, works to support inclusive land and water resource management. Early on the project began with a comprehensive gender analysis with a view to both making the project as empowering as possible, and also tracking its impact on gender dynamics in the area.

Few programmes to date, however, directly focus on women as agents of social, economic and political change in the context of climate-related security risks. An exception is the UN

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programme on Women, Natural Resources, Climate and Peace, which is funded by Finland and Norway and jointly implemented by UNEP, UNDP, PBSO and UN Women.

At the field level, the programme has piloted new approaches to strengthening women’s roles in local peacebuilding processes over natural resource-based conflicts in communities affected by climate change, such as in North Kordofan, Sudan (UNEP 2017). The approach - which combined developing gender-responsive climate-resilient livelihoods with capacity building for environmental governance and conflict resolution - has been taken up and replicated in other projects. In June 2020, the programme published a policy report “Gender, Climate and Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change” (Halle et al. 2020) and has created an on-line knowledge platform on the nexus of women and climate security.

Make action on the ground a source of sustainability, strength and peace

The sixth area identified by the EU is the most diffuse and hard-to-pin down: the idea that all European action should be a source of sustainability, strength and peace. The route to achieve this, it is argued, is to address the cross-cutting impacts of climate change by tackling its development, climate and security dimensions at the same time. Integrated socio-economic development programmes which enhance ecological and societal resilience domestically and overseas can, they suggest hopefully, encourage groups to cooperate over shared resources or common challenges (EEAS 2018).

There is broad agreement on the idea that the EU could do more to factor climate change into its foreign and security policy. There is no real consensus, however, on what measures to take. In the May 2019 EU Council conclusions on the Sahel, climate change was mentioned as one challenge to the security of the region and delegations were encouraged to climate into account when devising programmes. As the German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, said in January 2019, “It must become routine for us to take the link between climate and security into account in all conflict situations” (Maas 2019). Even so, there seems to be some work to do. For instance, EU Special Representatives for Sahel and the Horn of Africa were not specifically tasked to address climate-related security risks (Bremberg 2019).

Back in 2004 the Commission proposed the Instrument for Stability (IIfS) as a funding mechanism designed to encourage integrated approaches to stabilisation in third countries. The IIfS was relaunched in 2014 as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) with the specific aim of helping countries to build their capacity to address specific global and trans-regional threats (Sonnsjo and Bremberg 2016). One of the transregional, emerging threats identified by the IcSP was climate change.

However, despite the importance attached to climate change, out of a total of nearly 470 projects to date, there have been just half a dozen examples of where the IcSP has listed climate security impacts in the rationale and objectives for its projects. This equates to less than two per cent of IcSP projects having an explicit link to climate security. The IcSP has provided the EU with a first response capacity that has been important in EU efforts to stabilise crisis situations and prevent the escalation of violence (Bergmann 2018). At the same time, the instrument has come under fire for being complex, slow and poorly coordinated with other external financial instruments (Bergmann 2018). A mid-term review of the IcSP in 2017 argued that it has demonstrated added value and relevance, but that it needed to simplify its ways of working and enable the EU to respond to unforeseen circumstances with greater flexibility (EC 2017).

The IcSP, along with the EUTF, is due to expire on 31 December 2020. These instruments are due to be rolled into a new instrument known as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) which will channel the biggest share of

external action funds with a budget of almost €90 billion (EC, 2018b). Proposals for the NDICI includes €4 billion for rapid response for conflict prevention or in situations of crisis or instability. In 2018, HR Mogherini also proposed an European Peace Facility worth €10.5 billion (EEAS 2020). This Facility would fall outside the Union’s multi-annual budget and would enable the financing of operational actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that have military or defence implications.

The adoption of the Global Strategy in 2016 led to various structural changes in Brussels in order to develop a more integrated approach to crisis response. One of these was the creation of the PRISM unit. The catchy name is a shorthand for an unwieldy label: the Prevention of conflicts, Rule of Law/SSR, Integrated approach, Stabilisation and Mediation Division, and the unit is located within EEAS reporting to the Deputy Secretary-General of CSDP and Crisis response (Pietz, 2017). The unit was designed as a catalyst for the EU’s coordinated approach to conflicts and crisis. In 2019 the PRISM unit was merged with other units into the Integrated approach to Security and Peace Directorate (ISP). One of the innovations that ISP is supposed to operationalise is a completely new instrument of EU crisis management – “Stabilisation Actions” under article 28 of the Treaty of Lisbon. It was tested for the first time in 2017 in Mali, but there is no record to date of this instrument being used to deal with climate change issues.

Mitigate any unintended security consequences of climate policies

Europe sees, and positions, itself as a global leader on climate action. The new Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, said in November 2019 “If there is one area where the world needs our leadership, it is on protecting our climate… The European Green Deal is a must for the health of our planet and our people - and for our economy.” The EU’s climate strategy revolves around two core aims, to invest in a green economic transition by promoting energy efficiency and renewable energy production, and to help countries adapt to the climate change that is already “locked in” as a result of past emissions.

In December 2019, the Commission unveiled the Green Deal for Europe. It is an ambitious strategy that aims to transform the EU into a resource-efficient, competitive economy with no net greenhouse emissions by 2050. The EU is committing billions of euros to these goals. Between 2014 and 2020, one fifth of the EU budget was spent on protecting the climate (Bremberg 2019). The EU plans to increase that to 25 per cent of its 2021-2027 budget in an effort to mainstream climate action across all EU programmes (EC 2018b; EC 2020a). At the global level, the EU, its Member States and the European Investment Bank together form the biggest contributor of public climate finance to developing countries, providing €21.7 billion in 2018 (Sonnsjo and Bremberg 2016).

Clearly, this sort of effort could help avoid the world broaching dangerous climate tipping points which would lead run-away climate change and to help countries around the world adapt to those changes that are locked in regardless. To the extent this is achieved, it would forestall countless security threats. It could also deliver strategic benefits for Europe (Vakulchuk, Overland and Scholten 2020). As an example, replacing imported fossil fuels (of which Europe produces relatively little) with domestically produced renewable energy would reduce reliance on Russian gas (Sonnsjo and Bremberg 2016), mitigate resource scrambles in the Arctic, change the geopolitics of the Gulf region and alter the strategic centrality of the straits of Hormuz.

But while it is imperative to respond to the security risks posed by a changing climate, it is also important for Europe to be aware of possible unintended security implications of its own climate policies. The scale of the green transition implied in the European Green Deal requires wholesale and rapid shifts in energy production, which will inevitably have complex consequences for many, including perceived negative ones for some.

The way that these policies are designed and implemented could have implications for Europe’s stability, and for the security of fragile countries around the world. Efforts to
encourage consumers to choose alternatives to fossil fuels have already proven politically divisive: after all, the *gilets jaunes* movement in France began as a protest over the introduction of new carbon taxes. Meanwhile, the EU’s biofuel targets were criticised for encouraging the conversion of land to palm oil and sugar cane production and contributing to destabilising food price spikes (Muzi 2015).

There are likely to be transition costs in the form of stranded assets\(^{15}\) and higher unemployment. These will be felt particularly acutely in those places that previously relied on carbon-intensive production. There are also growing concerns that the imperative to reduce carbon emissions around the world could lead to some sensitive outcomes from a security perspective. Already, some countries with underlying fragilities are looking to nuclear power generation as part of future plans for low carbon energy production – leading to fears over the proliferation of nuclear technology (Fetzek and Schaik 2018). In the same vein, the rapid increase in demand for particular minerals, such as lithium and cobalt, which are required for clean energy and smart phone technologies could lead to new forms of “green conflict minerals” - where the trade in valuable minerals actually encourages and finances violence (Church and Crawford 2018).

**Figure 2: State fragility and climate vulnerability**

Adaptation is particularly important in the fragile conflict-affected states which tend to be the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (see Figure 2). However, these countries typically receive relatively little climate funding. If done well, adaptation programmes can support peacebuilding by helping countries plan for the future and providing a platform for dialogue and trust-building among stakeholders (Crawford and Church 2020). But in so far as adaptation is a form of deliberate social engineering, it can create winners and losers, favour certain elements of the population, be blind to existing social structures and become a cause for conflict itself, especially if the conflict dynamics have not been anticipated ahead of time.

\(^{15}\) Stranded assets are “assets that have suffered from unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations or conversion to liabilities.” In this context they imply carbon-intensive assets such as coal-fired power stations that are no longer economically viable due to climate regulation, carbon taxes and so on.
To pick just one example, the EU supported a climate adaptation programme in Kenya focused on forested areas critical to the supply of fresh water. However, the project was suspended in 2018 after reports emerged of the Kenya Forest Service’s forcible evictions of communities of indigenous peoples from one of the project areas, resulting in one fatality, and subsequent warnings from human rights organisations.¹⁶

**CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This report has provided analysis on the extent to which Europe - by which we mean both EU institutions and European states - has started to deliver on its own climate security rhetoric. It proposes the following conclusions:

**Climate security is a high-profile issue in Europe**

There is no doubt that climate security is an issue that has climbed high on the European political agenda over the past 15 years, at least at a rhetorical level. There is a shared understanding among European countries, diplomats and officials that climate change multiplies the threats facing Europe and its interests. European states and institutions have been quite effective at raising climate security up the international agenda. There is continuing interest among the senior leadership to help Europe better respond to climate-related security threats at home and abroad. But occupying a high spot on the political agenda does not automatically equate to being effectively addressed.

**Europe has a range of mechanisms to address climate security challenges**

The EU already has an inherently holistic approach to policy making, which puts it in a favourable position compared to many other regional organisations. The strength of the EU as a foreign policy actor lies in its ability to combine a wide variety of economic and political policy tools which offers it scope for action that is unparalleled in other regional organisations. But much of this scope for action remains unrealised. A senior focal point with clear accountability for action on climate security may help to coordinate these tools better. Meanwhile, climate and environmental issues are slowly making their way into some of those mechanisms, such as the early warning systems, but this remains marginal when compared to core operations.

**There is strength in diversity**

Climate security is not a distinct policy field within EU foreign and security policy - rather it is a cluster of different policy fields linked by the EU’s declared ambition to better respond to and prevent climate-related security risks. Different entities responsible for climate, development, foreign policy and defence have different mandates and timeframes. This is not necessarily a problem: coherence isn’t about always doing the same thing, but rather ensuring that the different elements of European policy are mutually reinforcing. However, this has also resulted in slow learning and missed opportunities for programmes that might have otherwise had a greater impact. Harnessing the different mechanisms and levers of influence available to European policy makers requires clarity of vision and purpose at the outset to enable a more coherent impact at the end.

**There are also gaps**

There has been more energy and political capital devoted to international advocacy on climate security than that spent on addressing its impacts on the ground. While the issue has gained policy traction at headquarters this does not always filter down to operational planning and missions in the field. Where it has been integrated this appears to be the result of individual initiative by project managers rather than a systematic approach to managing climate security risks. Other missions are failing to lead, for example, by minimising their

own climate footprint. It is perhaps noteworthy that the EEAS, for example, still does not have a climate and environment policy or an environmental management system in place. There is little learning across projects, departments within the EU and among countries across Europe, and shared and sometimes overlapping competencies between European Commission and the Council of Ministers also. This has resulted in important gaps in Europe’s approach. One area that appears to be particularly missing is the integration of climate security perspectives into mediation and peace processes.

**European climate action can have destabilising unintended consequences**

Europe is leading global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to help countries adapt to the impacts of climate change. This could help avert some of the worst security consequences of unchecked climate change, but these may also have their own unintended geopolitical consequences in terms of power shifts away from economies currently reliant on fossil fuels and shifts in the geostrategic importance of key minerals. These need to be anticipated and addressed if Europe is to have a coherent, effective and positive impact on the growing security threats presented by climate change, biodiversity loss and environmental degradation.

**Recommendations**

1. **Keep climate security high on the political agenda**
   - Support the creation of a UN Climate Security Senior Advisor or Envoy at the New York UN Headquarters supported by the existing Climate Security Mechanism. This person could act as a focal point for climate security action across the UN and be available to brief the Security Council as needed.
   - Support an “omnibus resolution” on climate security through the UN Security Council which could help set new international norms and practice about dealing with climate security.
   - Improve coordination among the donor countries funding research on climate security to avoid duplication, to ensure that a broad range of relevant issues are addressed and to highlight the lived experience of people in affected regions.
   - Work closely with regional organizations such as the African Union to ensure coherence of action.

2. **Translate the policy focus into core operations**
   - Appoint a senior adviser or a Special Envoy on climate security in the cabinet of the High Representative, with responsibility and accountability for delivering a coherent response to climate security challenges and to help Europe with its “last mile” problem of ensuring commensurate action on the ground.
   - Lead by example. Define a climate and environmental security policy that lays out the approaches to be pursued by the EU instruments. This should be coupled with an environmental management system with clear lines of accountability that cuts through the organisation, but where responsibility ultimately rests with the senior management.
   - Conduct a thorough independent mapping and review of different climate security work taking place across Europe to find gaps and duplication. Invest in mechanisms to share information, such as the Planetary Security Conference initiated by the Netherlands in 2017, and gather lessons on what is working to inform how action can be scaled up.
   - Ensure greater coordination of action between the relevant communities, services and ministries (defence, environment etc..) so that climate change and environmental issues feature prominently in defence and security processes and gatherings such as the Munich Security Conference.
• Ingrain conflict sensitivity into the planning, monitoring and execution of mitigation and adaptation programmes. Ensure that the geopolitical and security impact of such policies are taken into consideration.

• Harness a full range of tools for resilience and security. The Green Deal and the EU’s actions on adaptation must recognise cross-border climate impacts and prepare to integrate risk management measures into a much wider group of policies, from trade to welfare.

3. Invest in conflict prevention, mediation and peace processes

• Increase the focus on climate security in financial instruments designed to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

• Invest in expanding the cadre of mediators and peace negotiators who understand environmental and climate science and the dynamics around climate security.

• Ensure that conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding is part of the mandate of the senior adviser on climate security for the EU.
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### ANNEX 1: THE EVOLUTION OF CLIMATE SECURITY IN EUROPEAN POLICY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Relevant text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy</td>
<td>Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, Climate Change and International Security</td>
<td>Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends; tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone.... The EU is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2018</td>
<td>Council of the European Union 2018: Doc. 6125/18, Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy adopted at its 3598th meeting held on 26 February 2018</td>
<td>Climate change has direct implications for international security and stability. (The Council resolved to) further mainstream the nexus between climate change and security in policy dialogue, conflict prevention, development and humanitarian action and disaster risk strategies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2018</td>
<td>African Union and European Union, Memorandum of Understanding Between The African Union And The European Union ON Peace, Security and Governance</td>
<td>(AU and EU agree to) Jointly cooperate on climate-related security threats across peace and security policy areas, to strengthen the capacity to address the risks of instability, insecurity and conflict arising from the interaction of climate change and social, economic, demographic and political factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 June 2018</td>
<td>Climate, peace and security: the time for action: High-level event</td>
<td>Peace has to be sustainable in time. And sustainable peace requires good jobs, decent access to natural resources, and sustainable development. Sustainable peace needs climate action...So let us keep this in mind: when we invest in the fight against climate change, we invest in our own security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2019</td>
<td>Council of the European Union (2019), Doc. 9103/19, Council Conclusions on the Sahel</td>
<td>Ambition in climate action is not only about reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it is also about addressing the implications of climate change on peace and security.... On top of mitigation and adaptation, resilience building, food and nutrition security, disaster risk reduction, conflict prevention and sustainable development, notably sustainable demand side management and management and use of natural resources and nature-based solutions, are all basic pillars of climate change risk management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2019</td>
<td>European Parliament, Res. 2019/2930(RSP)</td>
<td>Declares a climate and environment emergency; calls on the Commission, the Member States and all global actors, and declares its own commitment, to urgently take the concrete action needed in order to fight and contain this threat before it is too late.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2019</td>
<td>The European Green Deal</td>
<td>The EU will work with all partners to increase climate and environmental resilience to prevent these challenges from becoming sources of conflict, food insecurity, population displacement and forced migration, and support a just transition globally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2020</td>
<td>Council of the European Union 2020: Doc. 5033/20, Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy</td>
<td>Climate change is an existential threat to humanity and biodiversity across all countries and regions and requires an urgent collective response. The European Union is showing leadership, and assuming its responsibility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX 2: CLIMATE SECURITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Organisers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 April 2007</td>
<td>Impact of Climate Change on Peace and Security (UNSC Open Debate)</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sept 2009</td>
<td>UN General Assembly, Doc. A/64/350, Climate change and its possible security implications. Report of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 2009</td>
<td>UN General assembly debate (Pres. Statement)</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>Maintenance of international peace and security: the impact of climate change (UNSC Open Debate)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Nov 2011</td>
<td>New Challenges to International Peace and Security (UNSC Open Debate)</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sept 2012</td>
<td>Climate Change - A Challenge for Preventive Diplomacy (UNGA Side Event)</td>
<td>Germany, Morocco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February 2013</td>
<td>Security dimensions of climate change (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>UK, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 2015</td>
<td>Climate change as a threat multiplier for global security (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>Malaysia, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July 2015</td>
<td>Peace and Security Challenges Facing Small Island Developing States (UNSC Open Debate)</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2015</td>
<td>Climate and Security - The Foreign Policy Dimension of Climate Change (UNGA High Level Side Event)</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April 2016</td>
<td>Water, Peace and Security (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May 2016</td>
<td>Peace and Security in Africa - Challenges in the Sahel Region (UNSC Open Debate)</td>
<td>Egypt, Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April 2017</td>
<td>Security implications of Climate change: sea level rise (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June 2017</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary Waters (UNSC High Level Briefing)</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Dec 2017</td>
<td>Climate change: Preparing for security implications of rising temperatures (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>France, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the UK;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec 2017</td>
<td>Addressing complex contemporary challenges to international peace and security (UNSC Open Debate)</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 2018</td>
<td>Understanding and addressing climate-related security risks (UNSC Debate)</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2018</td>
<td>Launch of Group of Friends of Climate and Security (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>Germany and Nauru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 2018</td>
<td>Water, Peace and Security (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>The Netherlands,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Nov 2018</td>
<td>Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>Germany, Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 January 2019</td>
<td>Addressing the Impacts of climate-related disasters on international Peace and Security (UNSC Open Debate)</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 2019</td>
<td>Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>Estonia, Germany, Kuwait, Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April 2020</td>
<td>Climate and security risks: the latest data (UNSC Arria Formula Debate)</td>
<td>Chaired by France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Resolution Details</td>
<td>Relevant Text</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 March 2017</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2349 (2017), On Lake Chad</td>
<td>Recognises the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region... and emphasises the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors (Operative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March 2018</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2408 (2018), The Situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasising the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by Governments and the United Nations relating to these factors (Preparatory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 2018</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2423 (2018), The Situation in Mali</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Mali, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the government of Mali and the United Nations relating to these factors (Preparatory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July 2018</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2429 (2018), Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the situation in Darfur, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity (Preparatory) Requests the United Nations and the Government of Sudan to consider the adverse implications of climate change... in their programmes in Darfur, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors and further requests the Secretary-General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting as appropriate (Operative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 July 2018</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2431 (2018), The Situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors (Preparatory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Dec 2018</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2448 (2018), The situation in the Central African Republic</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African Region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and stressing the need for adequate risk assessment by the United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African Region and the United Nations to support stabilisation and build resilience (Preparatory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Feb 2019</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2457 (2019), The Situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Recognises the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Somalia... and emphasising the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by the respective governments and the United Nations relating to these factors (Operative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March 2019</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2461 (2019), The Situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters among other factors on the stability of Somalia... and emphasising the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors (Preparatory) Requests the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States to consider the adverse implications of climate change, other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their programmes in Somalia, including by undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to these factors and further requests the Secretary-General to provide information of such assessments in mandated reporting as appropriate (Operative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 May 2019</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution S/RES/2472 (2019), The Situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and the UN, of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, energy access, and other factors on the stability of Somalia (Preparatory)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Resolution Number/Resolution Date</td>
<td>Topic</td>
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<td>28 June 2019</td>
<td>S/RES 2480 (2019) - The Situation in Mali</td>
<td>Emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies, by the government of Mali and the United Nations, of ecological changes, natural disasters, drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, energy access, climate change, among other factors, on the security and stability of Mali (Preparatory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov 2019</td>
<td>S/RES/ 2499 (2019) - The Situation in the Central African Republic</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of the Central African region, including through drought, desertification, land degradation, food insecurity, and energy access, and stressing the need for adequate risk assessment by the United Nations relating to these factors and for long-term strategies by governments of the Central African region and the United Nations to support stabilisation and build resilience. (Preparatory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dec 2019</td>
<td>S/RES/ 2502 (2019) - The Situation Concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Recognising the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes, natural disasters, and lack of energy access, among other factors, on the stability of the DRC, including through increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, flooding, forest fires, erratic precipitation and food insecurity, welcoming the leadership of the DRC in the development of national strategies to address these issues and in the preservation of the Congo basin forest. (Preparatory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 2020</td>
<td>S/RES/ 2520 (2020) - The Situation in Somalia</td>
<td>Emphasising the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the FGS and the UN, of climate change, other ecological changes, natural disasters, energy access, and other factors on the stability of Somalia (Preparatory)</td>
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</tbody>
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