CLIMATE-FRAGILITY RISK BRIEF

SOUTH ASIA

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CLIMATE SECURITY EXPERT NETWORK
Climate-Fragility Risk Brief: South Asia

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SUMMARY

The South Asian region consists of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Bangladesh. South Asia is one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in the world, and parts of the region are characterised by a high level of political instability and socio-economic backwardness. This convergence implies that climate change not only undermines human security, but could also heighten conflict risks. On the one hand, the region lacks the resources and capacities to cope with worsening first and second order impacts of climate change; on the other, climate change is increasingly interacting with socio-economic, demographic and political factors to compound fragility risks in the region. While some of these challenges are country-specific, many of them also affect the region as a whole and, therefore, necessitate regional responses and strategies.

In this context, this briefing paper charts out the ways in which the security implications of climate change manifest themselves in the South Asian region. First, climate change has direct impacts on human security, which are already being experienced in most parts of the region. Second, it has the potential to influence existing socio-economic and political challenges in the region that contribute to insecurity. And third, it could also interact with regional geopolitical fault lines around shared physical (geographical) features, such as the Himalayas, the rivers originating from the Tibetan Plateau, or the atolls in the Indian Ocean.

Among the various climate impacts, this briefing paper focuses upon five major ones: water stress, disasters/extreme weather events, increased mobility and rapid urbanisation, challenges to agriculture/food security and impacts on health. Some of these impacts may not have direct linkages with conflict risks as of now, but they impinge on the security challenges of individual countries and the region as a whole, also increasing the likelihood of conflicts and disputes within and among South Asian countries (Nordqvist and Krampe, 2018).
1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

South Asia is home to over 1.8 billion people (World Bank, 2018b) and more than 33% of the world’s poor (Schafer, 2019). It consists of low and middle income countries. Simultaneously, South Asia is the world’s fastest growing region, with the majority of countries recording gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates of above 5% in 2018. Even though South Asia’s growth trajectory shows an upward trend, in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) rankings, most of them fall well behind even in comparison to other developing countries. Furthermore, agriculture continues to be the mainstay of the South Asian economies and almost completely dominates the economies of countries such as Bhutan and Nepal. The following table provides data on population and development indicators for each country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As of 2018</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>Gross national income (GNI) per capita (current USD)</th>
<th>Human development index (HDI) rank¹</th>
<th>Relative size of agricultural sector*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFGHANISTAN</td>
<td>37,172,386</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BANGLADESH</td>
<td>161,356,039</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHUTAN</td>
<td>754,394</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>92.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>1,352,617,328</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALDIVES</td>
<td>515,696</td>
<td>9,310</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAL</td>
<td>28,087,871</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td>212,215,030</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRI LANKA</td>
<td>21,670,000</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Climate Action Network South Asia. *percent of employed labour force

South Asia is among the most diverse regions, with all the major religions residing in it - Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Jainism, and even Judaism and Zoroastrianism (in small numbers). Although communities mostly co-exist peacefully, there have been cases of sporadic communal violence and tensions in all South Asian countries, for example, due to inter-state migration (such as between Bangladesh and Northeast India or between Nepal and Bhutan) (Singh and Kaur, 2019). South Asian countries have some of the most uneven sex ratios in the world, with only Sri Lanka and Nepal having more than 50% female population (World Bank, 2018a). Societies are generally male-dominated and follow strictly patriarchal cultures that are associated with social instability and violence against women (Diamond-Smith and Rudolph, 2018).

All South Asian countries are technically democracies, but many have faced severe disruptions over the past few decades in the form of political transitions and violent conflict. For instance, Nepal witnessed years of civil war, waged mainly by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) against the government of Nepal during 1996-2006. In Sri Lanka, civil war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lasted until 2009 (The Commonwealth, n.d.). The Maldives has also been engulfed by political crisis at several points in its history.

Currently, terrorism is a major threat in the region (e.g. Taliban in Afghanistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan). Stability in the region is further challenged by (secessionist) insurgencies (e.g. Kashmir, Chhattisgarh, Balochistan), border disputes (e.g. between India and Pakistan) and sporadic communal conflicts (e.g. clashes between Hindu and Muslim communities in India, tensions between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks in Afghanistan). Other security challenges arise from rapid urbanisation, including the risks of riots, increased crime and violent conflicts between urban communities.

¹ Based on life indicators such as life expectancy, standard of living measured by gross national income (per capita) and years of schooling.
2. PROJECTED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

South Asia is replete with environmental challenges, ranging from climate change to increased pressure on resources (including food, land and water), deforestation and pollution, among others. According to the Global Sustainable Development Report 2015, most South Asian countries fall within the top quarter of the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world (The Energy and Resources Institute, 2015).

Projected major impacts of climate change in South Asia range from changing precipitation patterns (decreasing seasonal mean rainfall coupled with increasing heavy precipitation events) and increasing annual mean temperature trends to escalating flooding risks (such as in the Indo-Gangetic Plains), sea level rise, glacial melt (on which most of the region’s rivers are dependent) and growing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events (such as cyclonic storms, heatwaves and droughts).

Studies have shown that the average temperatures have risen over the past six decades in South Asia and will continue to rise. This will most likely impact resources, livelihoods and economies in the region (Mani et al., 2018).

Many parts of South Asia are already experiencing severe water stress due to ecological scarcity, as well as social, economic, managerial and infrastructural problems. For instance, according to a 2018 NITI Aayog report, some “600 million Indians face high to extreme water stress” (Kant, 2018). These problems are worsening with climate change and its effects on the hydrological cycle such as shifting rainfall patterns, droughts, and glacial recession. A recent study published by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) estimates that “two-thirds” of the Himalayan glaciers could melt by 2100, if greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are not reduced. It goes on to state that even if the targets of the Paris Agreement are achieved, “one-third” of the glaciers are expected to recede. This will have a dramatic impact on South and Southeast Asia’s main rivers and the more than 250 million people that depend on them (Wester et al., 2019).
Climate change is increasingly becoming a major driver of livelihood and economic insecurity in South Asia. The agricultural sector, which continues to be the mainstay of regional economies (Vinke et al., 2017), is particularly affected. Heat waves, water stress, disasters, salinisation and other such changes are already contributing to declining food production in most South Asian countries. Currently, there are around 300 million undernourished people in the region, and this trend is expected to be exacerbated by climate change impacts on agricultural productivity, food prices and incomes of the poorest (Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014). The IPCC warns that “in the Indo-Gangetic Plains of South Asia there could be a decrease of about 50% in the most favourable and high-yielding wheat area as a result of heat stress” while “sea level rise will inundate low-lying areas and will especially affect rice growing regions” (Hijioka et al., 2014).

Extreme weather events such as cyclones and floods, and the resultant landslides and other disasters are linked to burgeoning human and economic losses in the region. As per the Global Climate Risk Index, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and India stood among the countries most affected by extreme weather related events in 2017 (Eckstein, Hutfils and Winges, 2018). Islands such as the Maldives and low-lying coastal cities such as Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata are particularly exposed to cyclones, storm surges and sea level rise (a slow onset disaster) (Leutz, 2017). In Bangladesh, during 2000-2003, sudden onset disasters (including tropical cyclones, severe storms, floods and earthquakes) resulted in the death of 8,351 people and economic losses to the tune of $10.8 billion (Ozaki, 2016). These numbers are particularly concerning as extreme weather events are on the rise in South Asia, in part due to important changes in the climate system in the Indian Ocean Region (Alam et al., 2019).

Furthermore, climate impacts on lives and livelihoods have the potential to disrupt patterns of human mobility in South Asia, creating new challenges for populations on the move and in receiving areas. Across South Asia, disasters are direct or indirect drivers of displacement and migration in connection with other political, economic, social and demographic drivers. For example, cyclones and salinity intrusion in water and soil have been identified as major and, at times, direct drivers for migration in Bangladesh (both internally and between Bangladesh and India). Similarly, droughts, floods and landslides have been linked to livelihood insecurity and potentially subsequent migration in Nepal (Wester et al., 2019). Sea level rise, a slow onset disaster, has already contributed to the disappearance of islands in the Sundarban region (shared by India and Bangladesh), portending significant displacement risks in the coming decades.

These challenges are further compounded by the effects of climate change on health. According to a World Health Organisation (WHO) report, the direct damage costs to health are estimated to be between USD 2-4 billion/year by 2030 (Philip, 2015). One of the trends that have caused alarm specifically in the region is the increasing number of deaths due to heat stroke (Ministry of Earth Sciences, Government of India, 2018). Other concerns arise from indirect impacts on health - including increased risk of diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid and dysentery from flood-related water contamination; declining nutritional health caused by drought-induced crop failure; and post-disaster mental illnesses such as trauma, to name just a few (Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India, 2016).

Notably, recent climate change is also associated with the spread of vector-borne diseases to previously disease-free areas (Caminade, McIntyre and Jones, 2019), increasing the risk of humanitarian crises. In Nepal, the spread of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, lymphatic filariasis, Japanese encephalitis, visceral leishmaniasis and dengue fever is now advancing to non-endemic areas, the warming of tropical highlands and temperate regions being partially to blame. Also Bhutan has started to grapple with diseases that it had never seen before, such as malaria and dengue (Paliwal, 2013). Frequent cholera outbreaks in Bangladesh, which some scientists have linked to progressively more intense El-Nino events in the Bay of Bengal and warmer sea surface temperatures, is currently the most discussed climate-induced health issue in the region (Shah, 2011).
3. CLIMATE-FRAGILITY RISKS IN SOUTH ASIA

Considering the above challenges and the specific vulnerabilities of countries in South Asia, four main pathways can be identified that link climate change to future conflict and fragility risks in the region. These pathways are identified based on a survey of the existing policy, scientific/academic and grey literature on climate security (including official documents, think tank reports, expert views published in newspapers/magazines) as well as interviews with experts in the policy and scientific/academic communities:

- Regional tensions due to competition over scarce resources, in particular shared rivers, could escalate.
- Deteriorating livelihoods and threats to health, food and energy security risk aggravating existing anti-state grievances and could spur violent protests as well as conflict between resource users.
- Increasing and increasingly irregular migration, caused by gradual and/or rapid onset disasters, enhances fragility, particularly in rapidly growing urban areas.
- Increased poverty, inequality and grievances play into the hands of criminal organisations and armed opposition groups.

3.1 Escalation of regional tensions due to competition over shared water resources

Water is among the most contested resources in South Asia. Climate impacts on the hydrological cycle (e.g. shifting rainfall patterns, droughts, and glacial recession) will put additional pressure on already strained water resources in the region. Against the backdrop
of existing political tensions, water scarcity could heighten the risk of water conflicts between and within South Asian countries.

A case in point is the contentious relationship between India and Pakistan regarding the water resources of the Indus River. Per capita water availability in both countries is declining at a fast pace - having dropped below the 1000 cubic meter per capita per year threshold in Pakistan - and risks dwindling even more as a result of the rapid melting of the Kolahoi Glacier that feeds River Jhelum, a tributary of the Indus River. According to estimates, flow levels in the Indus River system will fall below 2000 levels between 2030 and 2050 and attain 20% below 2000 levels by 2060 (The Energy and Resources Institute, 2019). This threatens to further strain diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan.

At the sub-national level, dwindling water resources are likely to exacerbate tensions between different regions too. For instance, India has witnessed violence over river water sharing between federal states, notably a dispute over the Cauvery basin between the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (ET Online and Agencies, 2016). Similarly, water allocation has fuelled tensions between provinces of Pakistan, e.g. between Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1996; Mustafa, Akhter and Nasrallah, 2013). Such conflicts are likely to intensify due to climate change impacts on the Southwest Monsoon and increasing drought pressure (Stolbova et al., 2016).

3.2. Political risks due to worsening livelihood and economic insecurity

The impacts of climate change on economic and food security in South Asia, both in the form of slow-onset deterioration and intensifying disasters, also risk aggravating existing anti-state grievances, spurring protests and riots.

Climate-related livelihood and economic insecurity can aggravate tensions around issues such as food prices and subsidies, service provision and corruption, and lead to increased fragility. Pakistan, for example, has seen several protests and riots due to food insecurity, especially in politically volatile provinces threatened by separatist movements, terrorism and other forms of violence, such as Balochistan, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Newman, 2018). Internal instability due to volatile food prices could potentially spill over and affect neighbouring countries and the South Asian region as a whole (Hooper, 2010).

While economic pressures and food insecurity have the potential to lead to conflicts, political tensions and conflict in turn undermine capacities to compensate for economic losses, respond to increasingly volatile food prices, and withstand adverse climatic conditions, thus perpetuating instability and violence.

3.3. Fragility risks in the wake of increased mobility and rapid urbanisation

Increased and increasingly irregular migration driven by extreme weather events and sea level rise risk further exacerbating social cleavages, anti-migrant sentiment and distributional conflicts in receiving areas, especially in rapidly growing urban centres.

Increasing mobility, if not managed in a safe and orderly fashion, bears the risk of creating or exacerbating tensions between migrants and receiving communities, which can in turn be exploited to stir anti-migrant sentiment (Pisharoty, 2018). For instance, in the Indian state of Assam, there have been communal tensions between locals and Bangladeshi immigrants over the shifting religious and demographic landscape of the region, sharing of common resources, and granting of constitutional rights to the immigrants such as voting rights (Goswami, 2014). These are as yet not directly linked to climate change in the policy discourse, but their increase is a plausible risk for the future. It has also been alleged that some of the illegal immigrants are involved in “gun running, fake currency rackets and drug running” (Kumar, 2010); and that illegal immigration may fall into the hands of radical and terrorist organisations based in Bangladesh for infiltrating India (Gupta, 2017).
Yet it is internal migration from rural to urban areas that perhaps poses the greatest challenge with the potential to exacerbate urban inequalities, competition for urban resources and services, and tensions between local authorities and urban slum dwellers. South Asia is one of the world’s fastest growing regions in terms of population and urbanisation. Many South Asian megacities, including New Delhi, Mumbai, Dhaka, Karachi, Kathmandu, Chittagong, Chennai, Colombo and Kolkata, are facing environmental and resource stress due to increasing population pressure. Dhaka, with over 18,000,000 people and a population density of 41,000 people per km², making the most densely populated city in the world (World Bank, 2007), receives up to 400,000 low-income migrants every year (Szczepanski, Sedlar and Shalant, 2018).

At the same time, poor planning, infrastructural deficits, encroachments, massive construction drives and indiscriminate solid waste disposal, which often accompany rapid urbanisation, are stressing urban ecosystems and resources and undermining cities’ capacities to withstand adverse environmental change. Moreover, urbanisation in South Asian cities has come at the expense of many critical ecosystems that act as catchment areas during flooding incidents, thereby reducing their resilience. The immense stress that rapid urbanisation is putting on existing resources in urban areas may eventually put the region’s security in peril. As a case in point, immigrants in Dhaka (who are mostly slum dwellers) are known to be highly vulnerable to sex and human trafficking, rape and other forms of physical violence, crime, disease outbreaks and labour abuse among others (LeBeau and Tuckfield, 2017). Such circumstances could have socio-economic and political consequences such as radicalisation and violent extremism (Hasan, 2017). Urbanisation in Pakistan has been linked to the rise in sectarian attacks (in Karachi), as well as surge in popularity of conservative and radical groups such as Difa-e-Pakistan Council and even recruitment of urban residents (especially from college campuses) by banned Islamist organisations such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), which could have potential regional repercussions too (Kugelman, 2013).

3.4. Compounding risks of crime, extremism and terrorism

Increased poverty, inequalities and marginalisation, especially in densely populated urban centres where state authorities are weak, can be a breeding ground for organised crime and terrorist groups – in turn threatening regional and global stability. Climate fragility risks faced by cities in the South Asian region are compounded by poverty, inequality and other structural failings, with immense implications for human security. Large-scale rural-to-urban migration has led many migrants to live in urban slums in distressing conditions. According to a World Bank report, more than 130 million South Asians “live in informal urban settlements characterized by poor construction, insecure tenure and underserviced plots” (Ellis and Roberts, 2016).

These conditions can be a breeding ground for criminal organisations and terrorist groups that capitalise on lacking economic opportunities and distrust in public authorities. They also create particular risks for marginalised groups, such as women and children, including different forms of exploitation and sexual and gender-based violence. Studies show that these risks escalate in the wake of disasters, making these groups particularly vulnerable to the combined effects of climate change and insecurity (UN Women Fiji, 2014).

The linkages between disasters and violent conflict are not well-explored in the South Asian context, especially taking climate change into consideration. However, there is evidence of terrorist groups leveraging environmental disasters to gain popular support. In the aftermath of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, for example, when the government failed to provide enough relief supplies to the affected people, terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba seized the opportunity to secure legitimacy by carrying out rescue and relief activities (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013). In fact, the same group is known to have expanded its presence in the region by sending a “humanitarian” team to the Maldives after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013). Hence, it cannot be ruled out that terrorist outfits might capitalise on rapid and slow onset disasters to augment their recruitment efforts, particularly in regions which are already politically volatile.
4. POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Existing policies relevant to the climate-security nexus in South Asia mostly focus on adaptation and socio-economic resilience because climate change is primarily seen as a challenge for economic growth, development and livelihoods. Hence, the food, health, livelihood and energy risks feature in national plans on climate change in one way or another (expressed in terms of the impacts of climate change on the security of these sectors).

However, in general, the other climate fragility risks related to migration and urban stress (except in terms of disaster management and preparedness), sharing of resources and violence by criminal and armed organisations are not adequately addressed by the countries at the national or regional level. While the high vulnerability of South Asian countries to the impacts of climate change is evident and widely recognised, the security dimension of the issues is rather underrepresented in the policy discourse, strategies and initiatives. Though regional cooperation has the potential to tackle the risks described above, it is impeded by diverging perceptions, fragmented responses and a lack of coordination.

One major barrier for addressing climate-security risks is the fact that, whereas Bangladesh and the Maldives have been very outspoken in their calls for addressing climate security risks at the international level, India has been very hesitant. When the impact of climate-related disasters on international peace and security was discussed at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in January 2019, India argued that “thinking in security terms usually engenders overly militarised solutions to problems, which inherently require non-military responses to resolve. It brings the wrong actors to the table” (Goswami, 2019). However, at the domestic level, climate and environmental change are part of the policy discourse on ‘national security’, albeit only in a minor way. Whereas a warning against militarisation is certainly valid, it can however be debated whether the recognition of climate change-related security risks necessarily entails the wrong response. Possibly, such recognition might also just help make the necessary resources for non-military responses available.
4.1. Regional cooperation

Regional cooperation in South Asia has been hampered by “the differing approach each country adopts on environmental matters, which they basically consider from unique local/national rather than broader geographical perspective” (Zafarullah and Huque, 2018). South Asian countries are cooperating in various regional groupings, the main one being the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which was established in 1985 in Dhaka. None of the regional frameworks addresses climate-fragility risks or the security implications of climate change directly, although SAARC, among other organisations, has emphasised the importance of building climate-resilient societies. Despite the existence of conflict risks and areas, there is little acknowledgement of the need for conflict sensitivity in building resilience.

There has also been little movement in a practical sense (White, 2015). SAARC’s action plan on climate change adopted in 2008 has not produced tangible results. Geopolitical rivalries and fractious regional politics have impeded meaningful cooperation. India, specifically, has been attempting to side-track SAARC (and consequently Pakistan) by focusing on other sub-regional organisations such as BIMSTEC and bilateral cooperation (Krampe, Scassa and Mitortta, 2018). Since no SAARC summit has been held since 2014, there is little hope for an unequivocal regional approach to addressing climate-related security risks.

4.2. Transboundary river basin cooperation

Transboundary river basin cooperation is another area of focus in South Asia, since most of the Himalayan rivers are shared by two or more countries. Time and again India has been accused of being a hydro-hegemon, and there are ongoing disputes with several neighbours:

India and Bangladesh signed the Ganges Treaty in 1996 to divide surface waters of River Ganges at the Farakka Barrage near the border (built by India in 1975), but this agreement does not take into consideration Nepal as the uppermost riparian and the effects of upstream water use. Neither does it account for climate impacts on water availability at the Farakka Barrage (Rahman et al., 2019). Bangladesh continuously criticises the Farraka Barrage for causing both floods and drought-like situations (Malhotra, 2010).

Similarly, India has also signed the Mahakali Treaty with Nepal, but it has run into several implementation roadblocks, with discontent in Nepal over its provisions (Lama, 2019).

In recent times, the stability of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed between India and Pakistan in 1960 (brokered by the World Bank), has also come under scrutiny and strain. Both sides have raised claims of deprivation of water rights. Furthermore, the demand for abrogation of the treaty on the Indian side has been heightening after attacks on Indian soil carried out by terrorists harboured and/or supported by Pakistan. The IWT only allocates three rivers to each party without taking climate change into consideration or providing incentives for cooperation (Ghazi, Muniruzzaman and Singh, 2016). Climate change and lower water availability could therefore alter the equations dramatically.

4.3. Adaptation, disaster risk reduction and securing livelihoods

South Asian countries have made some progress on regional cooperation in the area of disaster risk reduction (DRR). SAARC has been working towards a more concerted DRR approach in the region in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. A Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management and Disaster Prevention was developed in 2005. The SAARC Centre for Disaster Management and Preparedness (SDMC), the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Centre and the SAARC Meteorological Research Centre were established under this framework. The SDMC has been successful in producing regional guidelines, conducting technical trainings, and developing a mechanism for collective emergency response.

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2 Among others are the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) Initiative, that are primarily targeted at economic cooperation and connectivity.
Nevertheless, since SAARC itself has become side-lined in the past few years due to geopolitical tensions, these initiatives have not been able to meet expectations.

Most countries in the region have national adaptation plans and/or related national strategies but these policies are not conflict-sensitive and thus do not adequately reflect the regional context. So far, there are only a few examples of attempts to try to link the adaptation and peacebuilding or development agenda. Furthermore, the focus is often entirely on the physical vulnerabilities whereas capacity and resource needs to tackle socio-economic and political deficiencies are not addressed. Yet these deficiencies impede implementing and sustaining adaptation and related programmes both at the national and regional levels.

4.4. Human mobility and urbanisation

Human mobility is a highly contentious topic in the region, especially regarding migratory flows between India and Bangladesh. In fact, if at all there is any form of cooperation between India and Bangladesh on the issue of migration in general, it is the agreement to deal with illegal immigration “within the larger framework of human trafficking” (Pattanaik, 2014). There are few efforts to find joint solutions, and preparedness for the potential effects of climate change on human mobility patterns is low, which increases vulnerabilities.

Urban policies on disaster risk reduction, human development and climate change as well as the respective institutions, infrastructure and planning do not account sufficiently for different forms of disaster risks arising from climate change. The perception of risk is mainly restricted to physical vulnerability. Policies and government actions often disregard the socio-economic context, particularly the plight of the marginalised groups that are most affected by climate change. The fact that uncontrolled urbanisation compounded by climate risks harbours a potential for unrest and violence, especially in societies that are already characterised by high inequality and deep divisions, is insufficiently reflected by policies.

There are, however, exceptions:

The Surat City Resilience Strategy provides an overview of short, medium and long-term strategies to make the city climate resilient. It looks at vulnerability, based on hazard risks and penetration of loans and insurance, and assesses capacity of the people in the city, based on social capacity, educational and income stability. The strategy specifically refers to the need for strengthening the social capacities of migrants.

Similarly, in Bangladesh, several NGOs are working to improve urban slum dwellers’ lives through climate resilience initiatives. Yet, in the absence of long-term strategies by the government and a lack of financial and infrastructural capacity, these initiatives merely end up as projects and cannot be sustained after resources are exhausted (Alam, Alam and Rahman, 2015).

\[\text{1} \quad \text{An initiative of the Central Government of Sri Lanka with UNDP builds resilience of post-conflict recovery and development to climate change risks in the country’s Eastern and Northern provinces (UNDP, n. d.). In Bangladesh the UK-supported Climate Change Programme works to make communities to climate shocks, particularly disasters, by contributing to Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (Independent Commission for Aid Impact, 2011). In Nepal, steps have been undertaken to make the country’s Local Adaptation Plan of Action (LAPA) conflict sensitive (Campbell, 2011).}\]

\[\text{4} \quad \text{The Surat City Resilience Strategy has been developed under the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN) initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation. It can be found at: http://www.asiapacificadapt.net/sites/default/files/resource/attach/Surat\_City%20Resilience%20Strategy\_TARU-SMC.pdf}\]

\[\text{5} \quad \text{Nari Maitree is one such NGO that has worked towards building the capacity of women from slum communities to deal with climate-related risks and play a crucial role in undertaking climate action on the ground, with the help of international collaborations. More information about the Community-based Urban Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience is available at: http://www.icccad.net/programmes/urban-climate-change/urban-change-adaptation-resilience.}\]
4.5. Violence, extremism and terrorism

Crime, extremism and terrorism are major issues in the region. They are prioritised by the governments, but also often instrumentalised for political agendas by different actors, thereby becoming a barrier for regional cooperation efforts. Moreover, the connections to climate change and environmental degradation are rarely drawn. The geopolitics of the region, especially the tense relations between India and Pakistan over the issue of cross-border terrorism, complicates any form of cooperation on such issues. Yet even existing counter-terrorism policies at the national levels or anti-terrorism cooperation mechanisms in the region, such as between India and Bangladesh, do not include climate- and resource-related aspects.

Climate change or environmental degradation are not considered among the root causes for extremism, crime and terrorism in the region, even in cases when there is ample evidence to prove the linkages, such as between natural resource management and the rise of left-wing/Maoist extremism in India (Kennedy, 2013). In essence, there are very few steps being taken in all the South Asian countries to address the conditions that are conducive to the spread of violence; and most approaches are reactionary and militarised in nature.

5. CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND EXPERIENCES

Individually, countries have taken first steps of working towards integrating climate change with security policies and strategies.

Bangladesh has a number of policies and initiatives (frequently supported by foreign agencies) that are aimed at dealing with climate-related risks such as physical, food, water and livelihood security. The focus is primarily on disaster risk reduction and adaptation to slow and rapid onset disasters such as floods, cyclones, storm surges and sea level rise. This is also highlighted in the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP), adopted in 2009 (Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2009). However, due to a lack of resources, the country has not been able to implement many of its policies and strategies on climate change.

The Maldivian government has asserted that “climate change is a national security issue”, as reiterated by former President Mohamed Nasheed in 2018 (Chestney, 2018). The Maldives Climate Change Policy Framework has labelled climate change the “greatest challenge to development and security” and lists sectors such as agriculture and food security, human health, water, fisheries, tourism, critical infrastructure and coastal zone management as vulnerable to climate risks (Abdulla, 2015).

Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan and Afghanistan also acknowledge the security implications of climate change, and have attempted to address them through National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs).

In India, the agenda of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) included “Resource, Water and Food Security” (Bolton, 2017), especially during 2010-15, reviewing the implications of climate change for national security, if mostly in terms of resource availability. Yet these discussions could not be sustained because of a lack of knowledge production and expertise on the topic, and prioritisation of other issues such as territorial integrity (including border disputes with Pakistan and China, and cross-border terrorism).6 India’s National Security: Annual Review 2015-16, published by the Foundation for National Security Research (FNSR), an entity closely linked to India’s national security elites, lists climate change as a “threat multiplier” and as an indispensable part of the changing global imperatives, stressing the need for long-term planning (Dasgupta, 2016). The annual reviews (edited by Satish Kumar) published in 2017 specify the domestic and regional dimensions of water security as well as food security, especially distress in the agricultural sector.

6 Based on interview with a former member of NSAB.
6. ENTRY POINTS FOR ADDRESSING CLIMATE-FRAGILITY RISKS

South Asia has traditionally been a geopolitically volatile region, stemming from intra-regional rivalries and extra-regional interventions. Large parts of the region are conflict-ridden or post-conflict societies in which peace and stability are fragile and sometimes completely absent. The war in Afghanistan, for instance, has left the society extremely vulnerable to various insecurities and the lack of governance has resulted in further deterioration of the state of the environment. The civil wars in Sri Lanka and Nepal have similarly weakened their governance systems to a significant extent. South Asian countries are, therefore, in dire need of resources and capacities to build resilience to climate change as well as to conflicts that arise from both physical vulnerabilities and structural shortcomings in governance.

The first and foremost task in support of comprehensive resilience-building is to create more systematic, credible, evidence-based and actionable information on climate fragility risks in South Asia, which is currently negligible. Governments should review their existing climate policies and make them conflict-sensitive, based on knowledge and information that is produced nationally and regionally. Furthermore, it is important to build durable governance mechanisms and infrastructure that can plan and implement climate change policies that also take security risks into account. In order to foster resilience effectively, policies need to also build capacity and mobilise resources to tackle socio-economic and political deficiencies.

6.1 Facilitate and strengthen regional cooperation

In response to climate-fragility risk number one - regional tensions due to competition over scarce resources - regional cooperation needs to be strengthened. The existing frameworks on climate change and disaster risk reduction (such as that of SAARC, BIMSTEC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association) need to be revitalised and operationalised in a meaningful way. This would help bolster preparedness and attenuate risks by building local capacities, early warning systems and other such mechanisms at both national and regional levels. There is also a need for greater cohesion on the understanding of the climate security risks and identification of areas of regional cooperation. It is important to formulate a regional framework that integrates various perceptions of these issues for a holistic implementation of regional climate change policies. However, such a holistically regional framework might be difficult to build, taking into account the current geopolitical circumstances. Therefore, bilateral and plurilateral engagements at the regional level could provide entry points for facilitating regional processes at a later stage.

6.2 Enable and bolster transboundary river basin cooperation

Protection and sustainable management of the Himalayan ecosystems are of essence to the countries of the region that are dependent on the Himalayan rivers for water, food (agriculture) and energy (hydropower) security. Measures to bolster coordination mechanisms between upper and lower riparian countries in terms of sustainable joint river basin management need to be backed up by policies at the national level that, for example, promote efficient use of water and energy. Since there are almost no mechanisms in the region that facilitate benefit sharing around such resources yet, this could be an important area for enhancing cooperation and building trust between the countries.

Climate-proofing of river water sharing agreements is an important entry point, as agreements need to provide for the projected increase of water scarcity in a changing climate. This would need strong diplomatic support and political commitment. Critical steps in this direction could include:

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7 India hosted the first Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, Disaster Management Exercise (BIMSTEC DMEx-2017) in 2017, in which countries including India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal participated.
making allocation mechanisms more adaptive/flexible, taking into consideration the flow variability that climate change entails;

designing mechanisms (special provisions) to deal with extreme weather events and disasters such as droughts;

including aspects such as water quality and variability in water demand;

reviewing dispute resolution mechanisms to include climate variability as a factor in order to avoid conflicts; and

establishing institutions for knowledge creation and joint scientific assessments, and ultimately for joint river basin management and climate change adaptation strategies (not just at the bilateral, but also at the regional level since many rivers are shared by more than two countries).

6.3 Support adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts to secure livelihoods

Climate-fragility risk number two - deteriorating livelihoods aggravating existing anti-state grievances - also entails a number of promising response and cooperation opportunities. Thematically, regional cooperation could target the food-water-energy nexus, a critical problem in a region which faces a growing energy deficit, water stress and increasing population. Energy will remain a priority area for the South Asian countries as they are largely energy-poor. Cooperation on access to affordable energy is therefore an entry point that could both help the population become more resilient through expansion of clean energy as well as build trust and goodwill between countries and societies. Some efforts are already underway:

India has proposed to invest in development and deployment of solar plants in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh under the International Solar Alliance (ISA) that was launched in 2015 at the UNFCCC international climate conference in Paris (Kumaraswami, 2018).

Cross-border energy trade is already taking place between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh (mostly thermal and hydro).

Lately, Bangladesh has expressed its intent to buy 2,000MW of solar power from India to meet the burgeoning energy demand in the country (Salim, 2018).

Sri Lanka has also welcomed the formation of the ISA, through which it aspires to energise its “Soorya Bala Sangramaya” programme (translated as battle for solar power).  

Another topic of shared interest could be strengthening the response to the growing risk of (economic) losses in wake of climate change. All countries have a common position on the “loss and damage” mechanism at the international level. This could be used as a tool for charting out national and regional plans to identify key areas in loss and damage, which could then be highlighted at the level of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and other relevant international forums. At the regional and national levels, building up the insurance sector, which currently has only minimal penetration in South Asia, could be another focus point. With the growing number of fatalities and losses due to disasters and extreme weather events, governments need to work out insurance-based solutions that prevent affected people from slipping into poverty or other dire situations.

Finally, the need to strengthen disaster risk reduction efforts could also benefit from closer military-to-military cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region, by incorporating a strong component of climate change in the mandate of the militaries of the region within their

domain of operations, tactics and strategies. An example of such an effort is the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which has a working group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and similar other arrangements (mainly exercises).

6.4 Manage human mobility and urbanisation

This brief identifies increased fragility from human mobility and rapid urbanisation overwhelming institutional capacity as the third prominent climate-fragility risk. As of now, there are no legal instruments to deal with cross-border migration in South Asia, except the formal recognition of the need for collaborating and cooperating on safe, orderly and responsible management of labour migration from South Asia to destination countries outside the region, in the Declaration of the 18th SAARC Summit. Therefore, **mutual bilateral and regional agreements** are necessary to address climate-related cross-border migration, especially regarding improving data collection and building information sharing mechanisms (cf. The Nansen Initiative, 2015). As migration is often a form of positive adaptation strategy, it is also important that countries link their policies on human mobility to their Sustainable Development Agenda and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), particularly targeted at the most vulnerable populations; and call for recognition of these issues within the global processes. A regional strategy would have to take South Asia’s political and ethnic diversity into account in order to ensure resettlement of migrants and displaced populations in a humane and just manner. In this context, South Asia might benefit from the experiences of other regions such as the Pacific or the Caribbean. Though still in an early stage of devising strategies on the nexus between climate change and migration, they already have experiences to share with respect to regional frameworks, specific projects of relocation, and attending to migrants in post-disaster situations.

Creating, supporting and expanding **city networks** in South Asia could also help deal with the security implications of urban stress and climate change. Cities such as Chennai, Jaipur, Pune and Surat in India are already member cities of the 100 Resilient Cities network. As the Indian Government works towards the goal of developing 100 cities across the country under Smart Cities Mission (launched in 2015), urban resilience strategies need to be based on climate change adaptation, effective disaster risk reduction mechanisms (such as early warning systems), socio-economic inclusiveness, universal access to basic services, social protection schemes for the marginalised and vulnerable populations right from the beginning. This mission could also expand to regional scale, involving other South Asian cities such as Dhaka, Colombo and Karachi, and build collaborations with city networks in other parts of the world (on exchange of knowledge, ideas and best practices).

6.5 Understand and prevent violence, extremism and terrorism

With respect to the final climate-fragility risk, developing a better understanding of how socio-economic grievances, resource degradation and climate change interact to potentially fuel recruitment and violence by non-state armed groups would enable the development of more effective policies to counteract them. For this, governments in South Asia still need more awareness and expertise. Regional cooperation on this issue may be difficult to achieve due to high levels of political hostility, mainly between India and Pakistan. However, bilateral and plurilateral cooperation between some countries could be a possible start, with a view to achieving a common understanding on the root causes for violence and armed opposition, and how these causes intermingle with climate change (even if they stem largely from socio-economic and/or political ideologies).

Moreover, diplomatic efforts could help develop different preventative mechanisms including community-based initiatives aimed at natural resource management, multiple hazard mapping and preparation of indices on different types of vulnerabilities, as well as counter-terrorism partnerships that include climate and environmental aspects. Furthermore, **transnational women’s networks** to address specific issues concerning women in the context of climate change could help create knowledge and awareness on this issue, avert violence against women in situations that are linked to climate change, as well

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More information about the mission can be found at: [http://smartcities.gov.in/content/](http://smartcities.gov.in/content/).
as bring women to the table of decision-making. Women are not only victims of violence, terrorism and extremism, but are also recruited by extremist and terrorist groups. Hence, it is important that the preventative mechanisms are more gender-sensitive and gender-responsive, so that the special needs, rights and roles of women in the society are taken into consideration.
REFERENCES


REFERENCES


